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ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION
If one steps back and looks objectively at the opposing brief filed by Ray's

Gardening, the observation is immediately made that the brief talks all around the
issue presented and never squarely addresses the issue. Instead, there is a cry that
plaintiffs seek to set aside 80 years of case law and run contrary to everything the
appellate courts of Utah have said on the doctrine of respondeat superior. A more
calm objective view shows that plaintiffs here are asking the Court to refine the law
to fit a fact situation that has not yet been presented.
In fact, plaintiffs do not disagree with any of the legal principles stated in the
opposing brief. The problem is that the principles appellee relies upon do not apply
squarely to what is presented. Refinement of the law occurs by looking at the
underlying policies and applying it to the new fact situation. Plaintiffs did that in their
principal brief and will briefly show herein why the opposition is not convincing.
II.

THIS CASE PRESENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REFINE THE LAW
Ray's Gardening argues in its brief that plaintiffs here seek to overturn eighty

years of respondeat superior doctrine in Utah. In making this bold statement, Ray's
Gardening ignores that plaintiffs do not ask this court to change anything about Utah
law. Instead, plaintiffs are pointing out to the courts that the situation presents facts
not earlier considered by Utah law.

The problem of the reasoning of the Appellee arises from the case law being
broader than automobile accident cases generally, and cases in which the vehicle
is a form of payment to the employee, specifically. For example, Ray's Gardening
cites to the following cases which have a fact basis different from that presented
here:
Cannon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 508 P. 519 (Utah 1922) - the driver
here was operating a vehicle which was not given to him as part of the
payment compensation of the employer.
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989) - this was a suit
involving a therapist.
Christensen v. Swenson; 874 P.2d 125 (Utah 1994) - this involved a
motorcycle accident with a factual issue of whether the guard was within the
scope of employment at the time.
Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272 (Utah 1951) - this is a
slander action.
Wilcox v. Wunderlich, 272 P.2d 207 (Utah 1928) - this case focused on
negligent entrustment without compensation.
Lane v. Messer., 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986)-this involved a company van not
part of a formal compensation to the employee.
Put simply, plaintiffs agree with all of the foregoing case law but points out to
the Court that these cases involve actions broader than automobile accidents; and
none of the cases involve consideration of when liability attaches when the vehicle
at issue is part of the pay package of the employee.
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In short, plaintiffs do not ask this Court to reverse anything or modify anything.
Instead, the facts presented require the formulation of a new set of guidelines under
respondeat superior doctrine. As pointed out in the primary brief, the Utah Supreme
Court has impliedly recognized this open question of law by reserving for the future
the consideration of what the rules will be when the vehicle is provided as
compensation. Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City, Corp., 2003 UT 4, 73 P.3d, 315.
III.

APPELLANTS' POLICY ARGUMENTS REMAIN UNREFUTED
An examination of the structure of the argument made by the Appellee shows

that a lot of space in the brief is spent reciting rules with which nobody disagrees in
talking around the argument made by the Thompsons as to why policy would lead
to an attribution of liability under these facts.
The logic of the Thompsons is clear and straight forward. An employer gets
a benefit out of the services of each employee. A fundamental principle of capitalism
is that the employer, in fact, attempts to maximize the profit off of each employee,
or else there is no logical reason to have a particular employee. Ray's Gardening
made an obvious economic decision that the services of Jaren Nielsen would be
profitable if they gave him a salary and other benefits, including unlimited use of a
company-owned vehicle. Ray's Gardening made a business decision to put the
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vehicle on the road and thereby derive a profit from its operation under all
circumstance by employee Nielsen.
The business decision to place a vehicle on the road in exchange for the profit
received from the efforts of the employee operating that vehicle justifies allocation
of the risk to the employer. As explained in the primary brief, the law has long
accepted that allocation of risk to employers is part of the public policy of the law and
the only question is when should it be done.
Ray's Gardening pushes the concept to the absurd by suggesting that an
employer who pays cash to an employee who buys a vehicle would thereby be
derivatively liable for the employee's driving. The line of liability does not go that far
because the employer is not making an economic decision to buy the vehicle, to own
the vehicle, to insure the vehicle, or to retain the power to take it back at any time.
The traditional test for scope of employment would be appropriate in those
circumstances.
The Thompsons cite to Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 317 (1965)
to show this Court that the concept being advanced is actually well-accepted in the
law but just has not been applied to these particular circumstances. That is, § 317
contemplates and states, as the general summary of the law of the land, that a
master may be responsible where a servant is using a chattel of the master. Section
4

317 is not exactly on point for the automobile case presented here but, standing
alone, presents factual issues for consideration of whether Ray's Gardening knew
or should have known about problems in giving a vehicle to Jaren Nielsen to use.
Probably an extraordinarily significant point which the Appellee misses entirely
is that this set of factual circumstances doesn'tfitthe so-called 80 years of case law
because those cases focused almost entirely on the conduct of the employee. What
the Thompsons present here is a question that is resolved by looking at the conduct
of the employer. That is, Ray's Gardening becomes responsible for the driving of
Nielsen not because Nielsen may be in the scope of his employment, but because
Ray's Gardening made a conscious business decision to promote its profitability by
putting a vehicle on the road, in the hands of Nielsen, with unrestricted use.
The other side of the analytical coin is that a ruling along the lines argued by
Ray's Gardening - - that one simply apply the standard, scope-of-employment test
to determine liability, invites employers to provide vehicles to persons who meet the
minimum standard of having a driver's license without regard to any risk, unless the
accident occurs within the scope of employment. The scope of employment risk is
such that it does not matter who owns or provides the vehicle.

In economic

language, such a rule shifts risk of loss to the employee while the employer profits
for using the vehicle as compensation.
5

That the risk of loss has shifted to an employee is not merely hypothetical.
That shift has occurred in this litigation. Ray's Gardening provides the truck to Jaren
Nielsen because it brings Ray's Gardening profit. Nielsen gets into an accident and
his own counsel, who jointly represents Nielsen and Ray's Gardening, are making
arguments that Nielsen has whatever responsibility exists for the accident. This shift
in loss allocation to Nielsen is not consistent with the public policies discussed in the
primary brief. Nielsen takes the risk of loss and thereby protects the profits of Ray's
Gardening and the policy that risk may be shifted to an employer to assure plaintiffs
have a remedy, is ignored.
CONCLUSION
There is no case law exactly on point found in any jurisdiction concerning the
allocation of liability when the employer provides the vehicle as part of the
compensation package. However, the Thompsons do not claim that this court needs
to reverse any prior case law. The Thompsons do claim that the prior case law does
not apply exactly to the fact situation here, and that a new rule needs to be drawn
consistent with the public policies of allocating risk.
The new rule needs to be that an employer that provides a vehicle as part of
the compensation package of the employee is derivatively responsible for the liability
of that employee. Perhaps, as an afterthought, it is unnecessary even to call it
6

respondeat superiors these circumstances so as to avoid confusion with the scope
of employment issues. However, the rule consistent with the public policy is to
allocate the loss to the person who anticipated receiving the profits from the use of
the vehicle.
This Court should reverse the district court and remand the case with Ray's
Gardening as an active defendant at trial.
DATED this 8th day of June, 2004.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

G
R
E
^
MARGARET R. WAKEHAM
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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